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THE "MIXTURE" AND "DERIVED-FROM" RULES ARE ALIVE AND
WELL IN ARKANSAS
Steve Weaver*
Did the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Shell Oil v.
Environmental Protection Agency' leave the State of Arkansas lit-
erally lawless concerning the proper management of wastes mixed
with or derived from hazardous wastes? That is what some industry
apologists have suggested at various trade meetings in the last year.
Admittedly, their position has some simplistic logic. After all, the
State of Arkansas, along with several other states, adopted verbatim
the federal mixture and derived-from rules as a part of their programs
for regulating hazardous wastes. If the original federal rules are
declared void, are not identical state rules also automatically void?
PC&E2 has bluntly answered, "No," since the decision in Shell
Oil raised questions about the validity of state laws patterned after
vacated federal regulations. The Eighth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft (hereinafter Goodner Bros.)3 re-
inforces PC&E's position and presages the legal analysis that pre-
serves the state's mixture and derived-from rules even after Shell
Oil.
Ms. Henry's casenote Environmental Law-Retroactive Vacature
of the Mixture and Derived-From Rules Under RCRA,
printed in this issue, provides a fine analysis .of the Shell Oil and
Goodner Bros. decisions,, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act4 mixture and derived-from rules, and the basic principles of
incorporation by reference. This article will not retread the same
* Chief Legal Counsel, Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology,
B.A. 1980, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, J.D. 1984, University of Arkansas
School of Law.
1. 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2. Throughout this article, reference to "PC&E" includes both the Arkansas
Department of Pollution Control & Ecology and the Arkansas Pollution Control
& Ecology Commission. For a description of the respective duties and responsibilities
of the Department and Commission, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-201 to -203
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1991). It should be noted that the Commission through its
rulemaking authority adopted the state's mixture and derived-from rules, but has
not been involved in the controversy generated by the decision in Shell Oil. The
agency position discussed in this article is that consistently advanced by the De-
partment staff since the Shell Oil decision.
3. 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992).
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to
6992 (1988) [hereinafter RCRAJ.
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ground. Instead, the casenote is used as the foundation for explaining
PC&E's position on the status of the state's mixture and derived-
from rules. As will be shown, PC&E anticipated the Shell Oil debacle
and built in procedural safeguards to prevent the inadvertent repeal
of its hazardous waste regulations through unforeseen developments
at the federal level. This article reviews the governing state law and
demonstrates the continuing viability of PC&E's mixture and derived-
from rules.
I. THE STATE LAW IMPLICATION OF GOODNER BROS.
In Goodner Bros., the Eighth Circuit could have facilely con-
cluded that the Arkansas mixture and derived-from rules were also
vacated by the Shell Oil decision. Instead, the Eighth Circuit's
discussion of this issue strongly implies that state law offered in-
dependent legal authority that was not properly employed below.
In response to the United States' argument that the state mixture
rule provided alternative grounds for upholding the convictions, the
Eighth Circuit stated:
Goodner Brothers Aircraft was convicted of a federal statute, 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), which is defined by federal law. The
federal law did not incorporate state law definitions of hazardous
waste.
5
The Eighth Circuit's emphasis on the federal statutes is important.
The federal criminal statute-42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A)-is sub-
stantially different from its state counterpart-Arkansas Code An-
notated section 8-7-204.6 And, as discussed infra, there are significant
differences between the state and federal definitions of hazardous
waste7 and the statutory mandates assigned to EPA and PC&E.8
Nevertheless, as described in the Henry casenote, the state and
federal mixture rules at issue in Goodner Bros. were identical because
the state had adopted by reference those portions of title 40, section
261.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations that included the mixture
and derived-from rules. The crucial question concerning the contin-
5. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 385 (emphasis added). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(5),
6921(b) (1988).
6. This is true of both the state criminal provisions in effect at the time of
Goodner's alleged violations and the current criminal provisions. Cf. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 8-7-204 (Michie 1991) with the same statute in the 1991 Pocket Part
Supplement.
7. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) and ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-203(6) (Michie 1991).
8. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) and ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-203(6), 8-7-209(a)(4)
(Michie 1991), discussed infra at nn.20-22 and accompanying text.
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uing validity of Arkansas's rule turns on the legal effect of PC&E's
incorporation of federal regulations by reference. Thus, before ex-
amining in detail the state hazardous waste rules, some discussion
of the state law of incorporation by reference is in order.
II. ARKANSAS LAW GOVERNING INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
Incorporation by reference is generally recognized as a legitimate
tool for the often gruelling legislative task of building comprehensive
and consistent regulatory programs in highly regulated fields. 9 It is
a particularly appropriate mechanism for legislatures, such as Ar-
kansas's, that are constitutionally restricted to short, infrequent ses-
sions. '0
The general rule is stated in Howard v. State ex rel. Stuckey:"
"[W]hen a statute adopts a part or all of another statute by a
specific and descriptive reference thereto, such adoption takes the
statute as it exists at the time, unaffected by any subsequent mod-
ification of the statute adopted, unless a contrary intention is clearly
manifested.' ' 2 Howard also recognizes an alternative means of in-
corporation by reference:
[W]here the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally
which governs a particular subject, and not to any specific statute
or part thereof, the reference in such case includes not only the
law in force at the date of the adopting act but also all subsequent
amendments or laws in force on the subject at the time it is
invoked."
Indiscriminate use of this alternative in Arkansas may lead to
constitutional problems. In certain circumstances, the Arkansas Su-
9. See MORRELL E. MULLINS, HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTERS, 130 (1986)
(Arkansas Edition): "As a tool in certain types of situations where a specific
provision, or the general 'law' on a subject, is incorporated by reference for
legitimate reasons, incorporation by reference is perfectly appropriate, although a
gamble." Id. at 134-35.
10. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 17. See infra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying
text.
The common practice of incorporation by reference has also survived challenges
based upon article 5, § 23 of the Arkansas Constitution, which prohibits extension
of a statute by reference to its title only. Byrd v. Short, 228 Ark. 369, 307 S.W.2d
871, 872-73 (1958); State v. McKinley, 120 Ark. 165, 179 S.W. 181 (1915).
11. 223 Ark. 634, 267 S.W.2d 763 (1954).
12. Id. at 636, 267 S.W.2d at 764. See also Bolar v. Cavaness, 271 Ark. 69,
70, 607 S.W.2d 367, 368 (1980). "[Wjhere one statute specifically adopts the
provisions of another statute as distinguished from adopting the law generally in
force on the subject, the operation of the adopting statute will not be dffected by
a later repeal of the adopted statute. Id.
13. 223 Ark. at 636, 227 S.W.2d at 764. See also SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST.
§§ 51.07, 51.08 (5th Ed. 1992).
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preme Court has found that an attempt to adopt the "general" law
through incorporation by reference constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. In Cheney v. St. Louis South-
western Railway Company 4 and Crowly v. Thornbrough,5 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court struck down administrative actions based upon
a wholesale application of federal law as state law. In both cases,
the Supreme Court found that a regulatory scheme that cedes leg-
islative authority to an unaccountable official of the federal gov-
ernment constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority.
It is tempting to attribute the holdings in Cheney and Crowly
to a nondelegation doctrine which has since become a legal anach-
ronism.' 6 In fact, in the more recent case of Curry v. State,'7 the
Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the modern view of delegation,
acknowledging the necessity of allowing expert administrative agencies
the authority to exercise quasi-legislative authority. 8 Nevertheless,
the Curry Court distinguished Cheney and Crowly rather than over-
ruling those earlier cases, and upheld the statutory scheme only
because the administrative official had the authority to modify or
reject any federal finding concerning controlled substances. 19
Thus, for the time being, administrative agencies in Arkansas
must recognize the nondelegation doctrine as a legal hurdle that
must be surmounted if incorporation of federal regulations is a
significant part of their regulatory programs. Fortunately, attention
14. 239 Ark. 870, 394 S.W.2d 731 (1965).
15. 226 Ark. 768, 294 S.W.2d 62 (1956).
16. See 1 KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.22: "Most admit that
the nondelegation doctrine as a practical force in the law is dead and perhaps was
never really the law. The [U.S.] Supreme Court has not since 1935 invalidated a
statute on delegation grounds." Id. But Koch acknowledges that the "nondelegation
doctrine seems to have more impact at the state level than at the federal level,"
Id. at § 1.22 (Supp. 1992), and cites Turner v. Woodruff, 286 Ark. 66, 689 S.W.2d
527 (1985) for the principle applied in some states that no legislative powers may
be delegated. Id.
17. 279 Ark. 153, 649 S.W.2d 833 (1983).
18. Id. at 159-60, 649 S.W.2d at 837.
The General Assembly meets in regular session only 60 days every other
year. This infrequency of sessions does not offer timeliness to the amor-
phous and ubiquitous problems associated with the manufacture and dis-
tribution of illicit drugs. In addition, even if the members of the General
Assembly were all trained chemists and pharmacists, which they are not,
it would be impossible for them to keep abreast of the constantly changing
drugs and their dangers. A Commissioner with specialized knowledge of
these changes can schedule substances in a timely manner.
Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged a similar deference to PC&E's
environmental expertise in Bryant v. Mathis, 310 Ark. 737, 839 S.W.2d 528 (1992).
19. 279 Ark. at 158, 649 S.W.2d at 836.
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to this issue-anachronistic or not-imposes some discipline upon
state administrative rulemaking processes that clarifies how federal
regulations incorporated by reference will be construed in the event
of a procedural "snafu" at the federal level.
III. THE STATE MIXTURE AND DERIVED-FROM RULES
The Arkansas Supreme Court recently reviewed the state's stat-
utory definition of "hazardous waste" in Bryant v. Mathis.20 The
court first quoted the relevant portion of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 8-7-203(6),z2 and concluded from this definition that the
general assembly had vested the crucial call of what is a hazardous
waste to the expertise of PC&E. 22
PC&E used its rulemaking authority to satisfy this statutory
mandate. The current state definition of "hazardous waste" was
first adopted in the 1980 version of the Arkansas Hazardous Waste
Management Code [hereinafter Hazardous Waste Code]. Section
2(a)(5) defines "hazardous waste," in part, as follows: " 'Hazardous
Waste' means a hazardous waste as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 261.3.''23
The Code of Federal Regulations section cited contains, inter
alia, the mixture and derived-from rules that were voided in Shell
Oil. The state regulation, however, proceeds beyond the text of title
40, section 261.3, of the Code of Federal Regulations, and includes
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) as hazardous wastes under Ar-
kansas law. The crucial point is this: the state did not adopt the
20. 310 Ark. 737, 839 S.W.2d 528 (1992).
21. "Hazardous waste" means any waste or combination of wastes of a
solid, liquid, contained gaseous, or semisolid form which, because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics,
may in the judgment of the department:
(A) Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness;
(B) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise improperly managed ....
Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-203(6) (Michie
1991)). Note that the state definition of "hazardous waste" is essentially identical
to the RCRA definition at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), with the significant exception of
the phrase "in the judgment of the department." ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-203(b)
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1991).
22. Bryant v. Mathis, 310 Ark. at 742, 839 S.W.2d at 531: "The crucial factor
here is that the legislature has stated that it is 'in the judgment of the department'
as to what substances would cause particular harm to the populace or environment
and therefore, be 'hazardous.' " Id.
23. ARK. HAz. WASTE MAN. CODE, REGULATION No. 23, § 2(a)(5) (1980).
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EPA definition of "hazardous waste" verbatim.24 Instead, using its
own judgment, PC&E augmented the federal definition to fit cir-
cumstances peculiar to the state's regulatory needs.
The documented legislative history of the Hazardous Waste Code
proves that the discussion in Section II of this article concerning
the state law principles of incorporation by reference and delegation
of legislative authority is not a post hoc analysis contrived for the
occasion of the holding in Shell Oil v. EPA. These issues were
addressed when PC&E was applying for delegation of a RCRA-
equivalent state program in 1984.
One of the prerequisites of delegation of the RCRA program
to a state is the submission of an Attorney General's Statement
certifying that state law will not hinder the implementation of a
program at least as stringent as required by federal law.25 In sat-
isfaction of this requirement and in answer to specific questions
raised by EPA, then Attorney General Steve Clark corresponded
with the EPA Regional Administrator on issues concerning incor-
poration of federal regulations by reference and delegation of leg-
islative authority.2 6 After discussing at length the holdings of Curry,
Cheney, and Crowly, Clark's letter states:
[PC&E's rulemaking] procedures do not surrender any respon-
sibilities for managing a hazardous waste program in Arkansas
to the federal government. The changes made by EPA in the
feaeral regulations adopted in [the Arkansas Hazardous Waste
Management Code] are not automatically incorporated into the
Code. The Department has the ability to approve or reject any
proposed changes and consequently, our situation is more like
that presented in Curry which was not found to be unlawful
delegation of legislative power.27
Attorney General Clark's conclusion was based upon rulemiaking
procedures prescribed in chapter 2, section 3 of the Hazardous Waste
Code. Section 3 lists those portions of the Code of Federal Re-
gulations that are adopted by reference and, most importantly,
24. Id. at § 2(a). These definitions are adopted "[iln lieu of the definitions of
the following terms set forth in 40 C.F.R. §§ 260.10, 40 C.F.R. 261.3, and 40
C.F.R. 270.2 (sic);" section 3(a)(l) adopts 40 C.F.R. Part 260, Subpart A by
reference with the exception of, inter alia, the definition of "Hazardous Waste."
Id.
25. 40 C.F.R. § 271.7 (1992).
26. Letter from Steve Clark, Arkansas Attorney General, to Dick Whittington,
EPA Region 6 Administrator (July 9, 1984) (on file with PC&E). This correspondence
is included in the package of background documentation, available from PC&E,
supporting delegation of an equivalent RCRA program by EPA to PC&E.
27. Id. at 2-12.
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establishes the process by which PC&E assures minimum compliance
with RCRA program requirements. For instance, section 3(c) declares
that the Department must institute rulemaking procedures annually
to assure equivalence with RCRA program requirements. 28 Section
3(a) expressly spells out the quasi-legislative intent and the effect of
PC&E's adoption by reference. Referenced federal regulations are
adopted "as though set forth [in the Hazardous Waste Code] line
for line and word for word." A reference to the federal regulations
"constitute[s] a reference to the regulation as adopted [in the Haz-
ardous Waste Code]." The effective date for federal regulations
adopted by reference is the date of enactment by the PC&E Com-
mission, not EPA.
29
Clearly, PC&E's adoption of these federal regulations was not
an attempt to blithely follow the federal lead on any definition of
hazardous waste that EPA might utter in the Federal Register. If
reviewed in terms of the Howard criteria,30 the PC&E incorporation
is a "specific and descriptive reference" to identified EPA regula-
tions, not an attempt to adopt the evolving "general law" in the
area of defining what is a "hazardous waste." Also, PC&E's leg-
islative intent is clearly pronounced: the agency reserves the right
to review an EPA regulation prior to its adoption as state law.
Thus, the state adopts a federal regulation by reference only after
28. Section 3(c) states:
The Director, annually, after the date of promulgation of any new or
revised federal hazardous waste regulations shall conduct rule making
procedures with reference to this Chapter necessary to maintain a State
Hazardous Waste Management Program equivalent to the federal program.
Such new or revised federal regulations upon the date of their publication
as final rules of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shall constitute
minimum guidelines to the Director in formulating rule making proposals
to this Chapter, shall not be construed to limit or interfere with the
adoption of provisions more stringent than federal regulations.
ARK. HAZ. WASTE MAN. CODE, REGULATION No. 23, Chapter 2, § 3(c) (1991)
(emphasis added).
29. Hazardous Waste Code § 3(a) reads, in relevant part, as follows:
The following regulations promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency are hereby adopted as provisions of this Chapter as though
set forth herein line for line and word for word .... All references elsewhere
in this Chapter to any of the following [federal] regulations shall constitute
a reference to the regulation as herein adopted; and provided that the
effective date of provisions adopted herein by reference as provisions of
this Code shall be the date such provisions are specified as being effective
by the [PC&E] Commission in its rulemaking and the effective date of
the federal regulations adopted herein shall have no bearing on the effective
date of any provisions of this Code.
Id. § 3(a).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 13.
1993] 719
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what must be presumed as due deliberation. 3' Under the state rules
of incorporation by "specific and descriptive reference" set out in
Howard, PC&E's mixture and derived-from rules must be construed
as legitimately continuing to define "hazardous waste" as including
those wastes subsumed within the scope of title 40, section 261.3,
of the Code of Federal Regulations as it existed prior to the District
of Columbia Circuit's decision in Shell Oil Company v. EPA.2
Shell Oil struck down the mixture and derived-from rules on
procedural, not substantive, grounds.3 3 In all likelihood, those rules
would have withstood judicial scrutiny if EPA had honored proper
notice and comment procedures. In fact, the District of Columbia
Circuit suggested to EPA a mechanism to preserve the rules pending
proper notice and comment. 34
Thus arises the crowning irony of the current debate over the
validity of state mixture and derived-from rules. While the court
that vacated the federal rules on procedural grounds offered EPA
the latitude to preserve their effectiveness, state rules that are in no
way procedurally flawed are said to be void without recourse. Pro-
ponents of this position see it as an inexorable conclusion of law,
even though no states were parties in the Shell Oil litigation and
the decision says nothing about its effects on state laws.
31. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-229(a) (Michie 1991):
In any appeal or other proceeding involving any ... regulation ... of
the Arkansas Pollution Control & Ecology Commission, the action of the
commission shall be prima facie evidence (sic) reasonable and valid, and
it shall be presumed that all requirements of the law pertaining to the
taking thereof have been complied with.
32. 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Allan Gates suggests that there is confusion
as to "which version of the federal rules Arkansas law now incorporates." Allan
Gates, Does Arkansas (or Anyone Else) Have a Valid Mixture and Derived-From
Rule?, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 697 (1993). The crux of this argument is
based on the assumption that the annual adoption of the Hazardous Waste Code
amounts to a wholesale re-adoption of all federal regulations adopted by reference.
PC&E has never construed its rulemaking function in this way. PC&E considers
each round of its annual rulemaking review restricted to those amendments proposed
by the staff; the whole regulation is not re-adopted on an annual basis for the
same practical reason that the entire Arkansas Code Annotated is not re-enacted
by the General Assembly in its biennial sessions.
33. 950 F.2d at 752.
34. See 950 F.2d at 752:
Because the EPA has not provided adequate notice and opportunity to
comment, we conclude that the mixture and derived-from rules must be
set aside and remanded to the EPA. In light of the dangers that may be
posed by a discontinuity in the regulation of hazardous waste, however,
the agency may wish to consider reenacting the rules, in whole or in part,
on an interim basis under the "good cause" exemption of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(B) pending full notice and opportunity for comment.
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This irrational and inequitable result is foiled by one of the
fundamental precepts of American government: the principle of
federalism.
IV. THrE FEDERALISM PERSPECTIVE
The United States Supreme Court has described the relationship
between state and federal governments under statutory schemes such
as RCRA as "a program of cooperative federalism." ' 35 RCRA itself
preserves the autonomy of states to construct hazardous waste man-
agement programs that fit their particular needs. 36 Consistent with
this scheme, courts have held that when a state has been authorized
by EPA to administer a RCRA-equivalent regulatory program, it is
state law, not RCRA itself, that the courts must implement. 37
Once the states' co-equal role in a federal regulatory program
such as RCRA is appreciated, the argument against federal repeal
by implication of state regulations immediately follows. As the Su-
preme Court observed in New York v. United States:
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.
State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative
agencies of the federal government. The positions occupied by
state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most
detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to
35. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992) (citing United
States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct. 1627 (1992)). In Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Supreme Court
described "cooperative federalism" as a program that "allows the States, within
limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own
regulatory programs structured to meet their own particular needs." Id. at 289.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988):
Upon the effective date of regulations under this subtitle no state or
political subdivision may impose any requirement less stringent than those
authorized under this subtitle respecting the same matter as governed by
such regulations, except that if application of a regulation with respect to
any matter under this subtitle is postponed or enjoined by the action of
any court, no state or political subdivision shall be prohibited from acting
with respect to the same aspect of such matter until such time as such
regulation takes effect. Nothing in this title shall be construed to prohibit
any state or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements
* which are more stringent than those imposed by such regulations.
Id. (emphasis added).
37. Williamsburgh-Around-the-Bridge Block Ass'n v. New York Dep't of En-
vironmental Conservation, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (1989); Thompson v.
Thomas, 680 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1987); Luckie v. Gorsuch, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) (D. Ariz. 1983). See also United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d
1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
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the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty" reserved
explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.3 1
Incorporation of federal regulations by reference is a common
legislative technique for states seeking to participate in a regulatory
program of cooperative federalism. 39 Claims that the state law is
vulnerable to unanticipated developments at the federal level should
be viewed with extreme skepticism, particularly when, as here, a
state diligently seeks to maintain its Tenth Amendment autonomy
when incorporating federal regulations. 40 This is true even in the
face of arguments that the RCRA regulatory scheme proffers a "take
it or leave it" proposition to the states that is really no choice at
all. 4' The United States Supreme Court has rejected this argument
and held that a state's agreement to join in a cooperative regulatory
program with the federal government is the product of the state's
own legislative initiative, presumed to be in response to the desires
of its own electorate.42
Within this perspective, resort to the common practice of in-
corporation of federal regulations by reference does not in any way
reduce PC&E to a mere shill for a federal regulatory initiative.
Instead, Tenth Amendment jurisprudence forces the presumption
that the regulation is an autonomous sovereign act, due all of the
presumptions of validity and judicial deference generally extended
to state statutes and regulations.
With these principles in mind, Mr. Gates's substantive objections
to the state mixture and derived-from rules can be answered. 43
V. ANSWERS To SPEcIFc ATTACKS ON THE CONTINUITY OF THE
STATE RULES
A. The Void Ab Initio Argument.
Mr. Gates first suggests that state regulations must be considered
void when their federal predicate has been declared void ab initio.
38. 112 S.Ct. at 2434 (citations omitted).
39. See Gates, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 32.
42. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2427; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
43. Of the four doubts about the state regulations raised by Mr. Gates, one
has already been answered. See Gates, supra note 32, at 703.
As for the authority of the Oklahoma case, Equidae Partners v. Oklahoma Dep't
of Health, (Dist. Ct. Washington County, Okla., decided Jan. 21, 1992) appeal
pending, No. 79124 (Okla.), PC&E refuses to abandon one of the cornerstones of
its regulatory program based upon an inscrutable one-line opinion that is on appeal
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Mary Ellen Henry, Note, Retroactive Vacature
of the Mixture and Derived-From Rules Under RCRA, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 749, nn.162-167 and accompanying text.
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This analysis might be valid if, for instance, a federal law adopted
by reference was declared to be an unconstitutional infringement of
fundamental rights. This kind of legalistic algebra breaks down,
however, when the federal regulation is vacated on procedural grounds.
First, the void ab initio argument fails to account for the
legislative intent embodied in the specific provisions of the Hazardous
Waste Code concerning incorporation by reference. PC&E treats
EPA final regulations as mere "minimum guidelines" for framing
state regulations. If an EPA regulation is accepted, it is adopted
"as though set forth [in the code] line for line and word for word." '
These and other provisions of the code demonstrate PC&E's quasi-
legislative intent to avoid repeal of state regulations because of
unanticipated developments at the federal level, the very implication
that the void ab initio argument insists is inexorable. When interpreting
statutes or regulations, however, the primary purpose is to discern
and implement legislative intent, not impose a pleasing but artificial
symmetry on the legislative process. Thus, clearly stated legislative
intent should prevail over the unintended consequences forced by a
void ab initio analysis. 45
The most obvious flaw in the ab initio equation, however, is
its total disregard for the Tenth Amendment authority reserved by
the states in the context of cooperative federalism. As shown above,
when a state adopts a federal regulatory program, it is presumed
to be acting at its own sovereign initiative. It follows that the state's
enactments will be judged by state, not federal, substantive and
procedural standards. Within this perspective, a state may adopt by
specific and descriptive reference a federal regulation subsequently
declared void ab initio, and legitimize it with the imprimatur of its
own proper procedures and police powers.
In essence, the void ab initio theory exalts mechanistic legal
logic over a common sense understanding of how modern American
government works, insisting upon rigid adherence to a legal solipsism
44. See supra notes 12-13, 29 and accompanying text.
45. Remarkably similar principles were at stake in State v. Corbett, 61 Ark.
226, 32 S.W. 686 (1895). There, in dicta, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected
an argument that a legislative attempt to amend a provision subsequently declared
unconstitutional was also void:
This amendment, it is contended, is void for the reason that, the original
section being void, there is nothing to amend to. Such is a rule applicable
to pleadings in court, but by what authority we are compelled to apply
it to the law-making department in enacting laws we are not advised. The
rule for the guidance of the courts is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature, and not the mistakes of legislature, either of law or fact.
61 Ark. at 240, 32 S.W. at 689.
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at the expense of the principles of federalism and state legislative
intent. Roscoe Pound warned against relying on such hollow logic:
"The nadir of mechanical jurisprudence is reached when conceptions
are used, not as premises from which to reason, but as ultimate
solutions. "46
PC&E contends that the void ab initio equation is itself flawed
ab initio by failing to recognize the clout of the states' Tenth
Amendment police powers.
B. Lack of an Independent Rationale.
The other substantive argument raised by Mr. Gates against the
validity of PC&E's mixture and derived-from rules is that the state
has failed to produce a record supporting the rules independent of
that supplied by EPA.
One aspect of this argument can be dealt with in short order.
Mr. Gates suggests that the inclusion of the phrase "in the judgment
of the Department" in the state definition of hazardous waste limits
the agency's authority to rely upon incorporation of federal rules.
Acts 162 and 165 of 1993 dispel this implication. These Acts require
PC&E to provide an articulated basis for its rulemaking decisions,
but explicitly state that reference to EPA regulations suffices as an
independent basis for state regulations. 4
Mr. Gates also suggests that because PC&E has not generated
an independent record supporting the state regulations, PC&E has
failed "to demonstrate a factual basis for the Department's
independent determination. ' 48 Apparently, Mr. Gates is claiming that
the state mixture and derived-from rules could not withstand
substantial evidence review if challenged in court. In a very recent
derision, however the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the suggertinn
that PC&E rulemaking decisions must survive a substantial evidence-
i.e., quantum of evidence-test. Instead the court held that PC&E's
rulemaking decisions were to be judged by the less stringent arbitrary
and capricious standard. 49
46. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 620-21
(1908).
47. See, e.g., Act 165 of 1993 at § 12, amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-
202(d)(4)(A) to read, in relevant part, as follows: "For any standard or regulation
that is identical to a regulation promulgated by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, this portion of the [rulemaking] record may be satisfied by
reference to the Code of Federal Regulations." Id.
48. Gates, supra note 32, at 712.
49. Gurley v. Mathis, 313 Ark. 412, 856 S.W.2d 616 (1993).
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Under arbitrary and capricious review of rulemaking decisions,
the agency action will be upheld unless "it is not supportable on
any rational basis." 50 Such an analysis would initially focus upon
what prompted the promulgation of the regulation in the first place.
It is inconceivable that a court would find PC&E's efforts in 1984
to participate in a federally mandated regulatory program to be
arbitrary and capricious or in excess of statutory authority. Thus,
judicial review would ultimately turn on whether it is arbitrary and
capricious for PC&E to remain faithful to its own mixture and
derived-from rules after the decision in Shell Oil.
PC&E contends it is both rational and practical to maintain
the effectiveness of the long-standing state regulations until a national
consensus is reached on a viable substitute for the mixture and
derived-from rules. As the Arkansas Supreme Court noted in
Department of Human Services v. Berry,5 a rule is not arbitrary
and capricious simply because it may work a hardship, create
inconveniences, or because an evil intended to be regulated does not
exist in a particular case.52 In light of these principles, PC&E's
refusal to voluntarily abrogate its mixture and derived-from rules
before alternatives are available can hardly be characterized as arbitrary
and capricious.
VI. CONCLUSION: FOR THE TME BEING NOTHING HAS CHANGED
Both Mr. Gates and Ms. Henry note the. disenchantment of
many states with the current mixture and derived-from rules. 3 In
official comments to current rulemaking proceedings before EPA,
PC&E states that "improvements can and should be made to the
way listed hazardous wastes and especially waste residuals and con-
taminated media are regulated." 5 4
EPA's hurriedly prepared Hazardous Waste Identification Rule
(HWIR), however, is not a viable remedy to the states' misgivings.55
Exercising poetic license, state regulatory officials have pegged the
50. Baxter v. Arkansas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 260 Ark. 67, 77, 598
S.W.2d 412, 417 (1980) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508
F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1974)).
51. 297 Ark. 607, 764 S.W.2d 437 (1989).
52. Id. at 609, 764 S.W.2d at 438.
53. See Gates, supra note 32, at 707 n.42; Henry, supra note 43, at 750 n.172.
54. Letter from Randall Mathis, PC&E Director, to Environmental Protection
Agency (July 23, 1992) (on file at EPA RCRA Docket S-212). This letter transmits
PC&E's comments on EPA's proposed Hazardous Waste Identification Rule.
55. See Henry, supra note 43, at 750 n.172.
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acronym "HWIR" with the descriptive pronunciation, "Haywire. '56
The near universal opposition by the states has sent EPA back to
the drawing board.
Hopefully, the demise of the Council on Competitiveness and
a muted Office of Management and Budget will allow EPA the
latitude to promulgate an environmentally protective and reasonable
alternative to the current mixture and derived-from rules. EPA's
leadership is essential to prevent a chaotic array of state definitions
with no national standard.
In the meantime, the long-standing and familiar mixture and
derived-from rules remain the controlling law, both at the federal
level and in Arkansas. Notably, since the Shell Oil decision, no
industry interest has petitioned PC&E to amend its current rules
through prevailing administrative procedures, 57 even though PC&E
has publicly pronounced that its mixture and derived-from rules are
"alive and well." In light of the premises discussed in this article,
the regulated community in Arkansas would be well advised to not
rely upon the risky assumption that Shell Oil vacated the Arkansas
rules by implication.
56. For the occasion of a July 1992 meeting between EPA officials and a task
force assembled by the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management
Officials, state participants prepared and presented the following ditty:
"The Haywire Hokie Pokie"
You put your right waste in!
You take your wrong waste out!
You put your right waste in and dilute it all about.
You do the Haywire Hokie Pokie and you mix it all around.
That's what Quayle's all about!
57. Regulation No. 8: Administrative Procedures, provides at Part II, § 3 that
"any person may file with the Secretary [of the Commission] a written request to
issue, amend, or repeal any rule or regulation .... The Commission shall either
deny the request or approve the initiation of rulemaking procedures." A similar
procedure will be available under the administrative rulemaking provisions adopted
by the General Assembly in § 12 of Acts 162 and 165 of 1993, effective August
13, 1993.
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